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THE INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A
GRATUITOUS TRANSFER OF APPRECIATED
PROPERTY CONTINGENT UPON THE
DONEE'S PROMISE TO PAY THE GIFT TAX
Jeffrey L. Kwall*
X wishes to make a gift of 10,000 shares of Acme Corporation stock to
Y. The fair market value of the stock is $2,500,000 and X's basis in the
stock is $500,000.1 X realizes that when one makes a gift of this magnitude,
the donor is required to pay a gift tax. X, however, is unwilling to incur
any costs in connection with the gift and therefore proposes that Y agree to
pay the gift tax resulting from the transfer. Y suggests that X simply give
her the shares and assures X that if he still wants Y to pay the gift tax when
the tax is due, she will gladly do so. X trusts Y and her proposal is accept-
able to him, but he nevertheless decides to discuss the idea with his tax ad-
visor, Z.
Z informs X that he will be making a serious mistake if he transfers the
shares in the absence of an agreement requiring Y to pay the gift tax as a
condition to the transfer. Z assures X that he is not questioning Y's integ-
rity and insists that his only motive for suggesting the conditional transfer is
to minimize the tax liability of both X and Y. Z states that if X transfers
the shares in the absence of an agreement stipulating that Y will pay the gift
tax and Y ultimately does pay the gift tax when due, Y will pay a gift tax
of $1,000,000 and X will pay an income tax of $650,000. Alternatively, if Y
agrees to pay the resulting gift tax as a condition to the transfer, the trans-
action can be structured such that Y will pay a gift tax of $700,000 and X
will pay no income tax.'
This planning premium has in the past been available to prudent tax-
payers. Although the Internal Revenue Service has actively fought this
result, reliance on questionable precedent has hampered the courts from
mitigating the disparate treatment. As the tax court has stated, "[w]e are
not prepared at this time to reexamine an intricate and consistent pattern of
* Associate, Schwartz & Freeman, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Bucknell University; M.B.A.,
The Wharton School; J.D. (cum laude), University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. Basis is generally defined as the cost of the property. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). In this ex-
ample, value and basis are proportionately allocated among the shares. Thus, the fair market
value of each share is $250 and X's basis in each share is $50.
This article is concerned exclusively with gifts of appreciated property. For an informative
discussion contrasting the tax consequences of a gift of appreciated property contingent upon a
donee's agreement to pay the gift tax with a gift of unappreciated property or cash pursuant to
such an agreement, see Recent Development, Federal Income Tax-Net Gift Doctrine, 63 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 1074 (1978).
2. See notes 4-12 and accompanying text infra for an explanation of these calculations.
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decision that has evolved over the years in this field. Things have gone too
far by now to wipe the slate clean and start all over again. ' A reexamina-
tion of the law will reveal that the magnitude of the premium associated
with advance planning in this area is unjustified and should not be
perpetuated.
NET GIFT TREATMENT
To demonstrate why the planning premium associated with a pretransfer
agreement is not justified, it is essential to distinguish the gift tax conse-
quences from the income tax consequences of such a transaction. The gift
tax treatment of these transfers, although well established, must be explored
in order to understand the controversy surrounding the income tax conse-
quences. The gift tax treatment will be illustrated in the context of X's gift
of stock to Y.
Y suggested that X transfer the shares to her without a formal agreement
requiring Y to pay the gift tax. Were the transfer executed in this manner, a
gift tax would be imposed on $2,500,000, the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred." When the graduated gift tax rate schedule is applied to a
$2,500,000 gift, the tax due is approximately $1,000,000.' The donor is re-
quired to pay this tax.6 If the donor pays the gift tax, there are no addi-
tional tax consequences to the donor upon payment, nor are there any tax
consequences to the donee. If, however, the donee rather than the donor
pays the gift tax, further tax consequences to the parties will arise at the
time the gift tax is paid because the payment of a liability of another gives
rise to income to the party whose liability is satisfied pursuant to Old Col-
3. Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 315 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Tax Court repeated this language in Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 675
(1978), appeal pending, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. argued July 16, 1980). Accord Owen v. Commis-
sioner, 652 F.2d 1271, 1278 (6th Cir. 1981) (the principles of stare decisis are of special impor-
tance in the tax field because uncertainty and variety should be avoided).
4. I.R.C. § 2501(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The value of a gift for gift tax purposes is
the value of the gift on the date the gift is made. Id. § 2512(a).
5. The tax is computed by applying the uniform estate and gift tax rate schedule, id. §
2001(c), to the aggregate value of all taxable gifts the donor has ever made, including the cur-
rent gift, and deducting from the tax which would be due on this aggregate amount all gift
taxes the donor previously paid. Id. § 2502(a).
To simplify the hypothetical, several assumptions have been made. First, it is assumed that
X's gift to Y was X's first taxable gift. In addition, the hypothetical ignores the unified credit
against the gift tax, id. § 2505, and the annual exclusion for each donee. Id. § 2503(b). It
should be noted that for gifts made after December 31, 1981, a modified uniform estate and
gift tax rate schedule will apply. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §
402, 95 Stat. 172 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 2001).
6. I.R.C. § 2502(d) (1976). After the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-34, § 442, 95 Stat. 172, becomes effective this provision will be found at I.R.C. § 2502(c).
Although the Internal Revenue Code places primary liability for the gift tax on the donor, the
donee is secondarily liable for any unpaid tax to the extent of the value of the gift. I.R.C. §
6324(b) (1976).
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ony Trust Co. v. Commissioner.' Therefore, the donor will be deemed to
have received income of $1,000,000. Consequently, if Y discharges X's
$1,000,000 gift tax liability in the absence of an obligation to do so, X will
pay an income tax on the $1,000,000 of approximately $650,000.8
In contrast, if Y agrees to discharge X's gift tax liability as a condition to
the gift, the tax consequences to the parties are different from those that
result in the absence of such an agreement. When a gift is made contingent
upon the donee paying the gift tax, the transfer is treated as a net gift. In
other words, the property transferred is valued net of tax for gift tax pur-
poses.' Thus, if X transfers stock with a fair market value of $2,500,000
contingent upon an agreement that Y will pay the resulting gift tax, the gift
is valued for gift tax purposes at $1,800,000 since a gift of this magnitude
generates a gift tax liability of approximately $700,000.' ° Hence, a lesser
gift tax is imposed on a net gift than on a conventional gift which is valued
at fair market value for gift tax purposes. I Despite this disparity in gift tax
treatment, the courts and the Service agree that the reduced gift tax
resulting from a pretransfer agreement is justified.' 2 The controversy, in-
stead, relates to the establishment of additional tax consequences resulting
from the donee's promise to discharge the donor's gift tax liability and the
fulfillment of that promise.
7. 279 U.S. 716 (1929). If the donee's intent in paying the gift tax is gratuitous, it is
arguable that this tax payment is a gift. Thus, with respect to this tax payment, the original
donee is a donor subject to a gift tax. Cf. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960)
(an objective determination of a transferor's intention in making a transfer determines whether
that transfer is a gift or income to the transferee).
8. It is assumed that X files a joint return and has no other taxable income in the year in
which Y pays X's gift tax. If the gift tax liability is discharged after 1981, the income tax will
be less because of the rate reductions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
9. See Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350, 1356-57 (1952), acq., 1952-2 C.B. 2. To
compute the amount of the gift tax to be deducted from the gross value of the property
transferred, the Service acknowledges the following formula:
Tenative Tax
= True Tax
1 + Rate of Tax
Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310.
10. See note 5 supra for the-assumptions on which this calculation is based. Although the
donee pays the gift tax when the parties structure a net gift transaction, it is the donor's
unified credit which is relevant to the computation of the tax. See Rev. Rul. 81-223, 1981-39
I.R.B. 6.
11. A more than proportionate reduction in the gift tax results because of the graduated
nature of the gift tax rate schedule. As a result of the graduated schedule, the net gift is taxed
at a lesser marginal rate than the marginal rate at which the gross value of the property would
have been taxed. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1976). Furthermore, once a donor makes a net gift, all
of the donor's future gifts will be taxed at a lesser marginal rate than would otherwise apply
since the value of all past gifts influences the marginal rate at which future gifts will be taxed.
See id. § 2502(a).
12. See note 9 supra.
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The tax consequences to the donor associated with the donee's promise
and subsequent payment of the gift tax depend upon the theory adopted to
justify net gift treatment at the time of the transfer. Net gift treatment has
been justified by either a retained interest theory or a part gift/part sale
characterization. The retained interest theory was adopted by those courts
first authorizing net gift treatment in the case of a gift made contingent
upon a donee's agreement to pay the gift tax. In Harrison v. Commis-
sioner, the court stated, "[w]e hold that the amount of the gift tax may be
excluded, as a retained interest, from the gross value of the gifts in deter-
mining the net value." 3 Shortly thereafter, in Lingo v. Commissioner," the
court again allowed net gift treatment when a donee agreed to pay the gift
tax. The Lingo court cited Harrison for the proposition that:
since the obligation of the trustee to pay the gift tax was incurred as a
condition to the making of a gift, the donor did not intend that the
amount of the property necessary for the gift tax liability would be a gift
to the trust, and . . . such amount was not effective as property passing
from the donor.'"
The retained interest theory treats the donor as transferring only the
value of the property net of tax to the donee. Thus the donor retains an in-
terest in the property transferred, the value of which is equivalent to the
donor's gift tax liability. Hence, if Y agrees to pay the gift tax on the
shares of stock worth $2,500,000 as a condition of the transfer, this theory
treats X as transferring a $1,800,000 interest to Y and retaining a $700,000
interest in the property.' 6 Basis is allocated pro rata to the donee's interest
and the donor's retained interest.' 7 Hence, X's basis in his retained interest
is $140,000.81 Notwithstanding the donee's promise to discharge the donor's
13. 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 1350, 1356 (1952) (emphasis added).
14. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954).
15. Id. at 441.
16. The gift tax due on the net gift is equivalent to the value of the donor's retained in-
terest.
17. The Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly authorize a pro rata allocation of basis
under these circumstances. It is, however, generally accepted that when part of a property is
sold, a pro rata share of the transferor's basis is allocated to the sale to determine the
transferor's taxable gain. The transferor then retains a pro rata share of basis in that portion
of the property that was not transferred. See Welsh Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d
391, 395 (4th Cir. 1960) (basis allocated between the transferred leasehold and the reversionary
interest); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957). In the case of a gift, the Treasury has implicitly
acknowledged that an allocation of basis is appropriate when a donor gratuitously transfers a
term interest. Id. § 1.1015-1(b) (1971). No compelling reason exists to limit this pro rata alloca-
tion of basis to gratuitous transfers of term interests. Thus, it is arguable that when the retain-
ed interest analysis is employed, the donor's basis should be allocated pro rata to the portion
of the property transferred and the donor's retained interest.
18. The following equation is used to calculate X's pro rata basis in his retained interest:
Retained Interest ($700,000)
x Basis ($500,000) = $140,000.
Fair Market Value ($2,500,000)
[Vol. 31:45
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gift tax liability, no further tax consequences to the parties result until the
donee actually pays the gift tax.' 9 The donee's discharge of the donor's gift
tax liability necessarily entails the disposition of the donor's retained in-
terest, thereby triggering a realization event on behalf of the donor.2 0
Because the surrender of the donor's retained interest in the property is en-
twined with the donee's discharge of the donor's liability stemming from
the earlier net gift transaction, reliance on an Old Colony Trust analysis"
to attribute income to the donor pursuant to the discharge of the donor's
gift tax liability is precluded. This does not mean, however, that there are
no tax consequences associated with the latter transaction although this in-
ference, at least in one instance, has been mistakenly drawn.22 Rather, when
Y pays X's gift tax, X should be treated as realizing $700,000.23 Conse-
quently, X should be compelled to recognize a $560,000 gain." The courts,
however, have not addressed the tax consequences associated with the
disposition of the donor's retained interest, nor has the Service raised the
issue. This explains why Z advised X that Y's agreement to pay X's gift tax
as a condition to the transfer would result only in the payment of a gift tax
on the net gift.
As an alternative to the retained interest theory, the Service has frequent-
ly characterized a transfer of appreciated property contingent upon an
agreement by the donee to pay the gift tax as a part gift/part sale., A part
gift/part sale characterization treats the donee's promise to pay the gift tax
as contemporaneous' consideration for the transfer of the gross property by
the donor. Thus, if Y agrees to pay X's gift tax as a condition to the
transfer, the Service has argued that X is exchanging $2,500,000 worth of
19. At the time of the transfer, no realization event with respect to the donor's retained in-
terest occurs.
20. See text accompanying notes 93-99 infra.
21. See note 69 infra.
22. Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 n.1 (4th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes
97-104 infra for a disucssion of the tax consequences associated with the disposition of the
donor's retained interest.
23. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976), provides that the amount realized from the sale or other
disposition of property equals the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any
property other than money received in the transaction.
24. X's $560,000 gain is calculated by deducting his basis in the retained interest ($140,000)
from his amount realized ($700,000). Id. § 1001(a), (c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Since the
Acme Corporation stock is a capital asset, the gain X realizes pursuant to disposition of his re-
tained interest is a capital gain. Id. § 1221 (1976).
25. See, e.g., Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 315 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.
1978); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 364 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1969). Both Turner and Hirst involved transfers to individuals. The Service also has ad-
vanced the part gift/part sale theory in connection with transfers in trust. See Estate of Henry
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 669 (1978), appeal pending, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. argued July
16, 1980); Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed nolle pros., (6th
Cir. 1972) (the Service only advanced the part gift/part sale theory as an alternative argument).
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stock for $700,000, the value of Y's promise. 6 Net gift treatment results
since only the bargain element of the exchange, $1,800,000, constitutes a
gift." As a result of this gift, X is liable for a $700,000 gift tax.28
In addition to the gift element, however, the presence of contem-
poraneous consideration triggers an immediate realization event on behalf
of X.' 9 Consequently, X realizes $700,000 in the exchange. To the extent
that X's amount realized exceeds his total adjusted basis of $500,000 in the
property transferred, 0 X realizes taxable gain."1 Hence, in addition to the
$700,000 gift tax imposed on the transfer, X must recognize a $200,000 gain
at the time of the transfer. 2 When Y actually discharges X's gift tax liabil-
ity at a later date, no additional tax consequences to the parties result.
Until recently, no foundation existed upon which the Service could base a
compelling argument that a donee's mere promise to discharge the donor's
gift tax liability constitutes contemporaneous consideration for an otherwise
gratuitous transfer.33 Thus, the courts appropriately rejected this theory
when the Service advanced it in past cases.3 ' In light of this precedent, Z
apparently did not regard the Service's part gift/part sale characterization
as a significant threat to his conclusion that a pretransfer agreement be-
tween X and Y would limit the tax consequences of the transaction to a gift
tax on the net gift.
THE INCOME TAX CONTROVERSY
An examination of the evolution of the case law will reveal why uncer-
tainty has developed over the income tax consequences associated with the
donee's promise and the ultimate discharge of the donor's gift tax liability.
26. The gift tax due on the net gift is equivalent to the value of the donee's contem-
poraneous consideration.
27. The Code provides that when property is transferred for less than full consideration,
the amount by which the property's fair market value exceeds this consideration is a gift.
I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1976).
28. Id. §§ 2501(a), 2502(a), 2512(a).
29. See note 23 supra.
30. The courts and the Service have rejected a pro rata allocation of basis in a part
gift/part sale. See, e.g., Fincke v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 510, 515 (1939), acq., I.T. 3335,
1939-2 C.B. 1934; Ltr. Rul. 7752001. It is, however, arguable that this position is inconsistent
with I.R.C. § 1011(b) (1976), which provides that a pro rata allocation of basis is appropriate
in the case of a bargain sale to a charity.
Although the Service has rejected a pro rata allocation of basis in a part gift/part sale, this
does not affect the propriety of allocating basis when the donor is regarded as retaining an in-
terest in the property transfered. See note 17 supra.
31. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
32. X's $200,000 gain is computed by deducting his basis in the property ($500,000) from
his amount realized ($700,000). Id. § 1001(a), (c) (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979). Since the Acme Cor-
poration stock is a capital asset, the gain X realizes pursuant to the gift/part sale is a capital
gain. Id. § 1221 (1976).
33. For a discussion of recent authority supporting a part gift/part sale argument, see notes
74-80 and accompanying text infra.
34. See note 62 infra.
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Decisions reviewing the development of the relevant law35 commence the
analysis with Estate of Staley v. Commissioner.36 Staley involved gifts of
stock to a trust for the benefit of the donor's children, in consideration for
$150,000 to be paid to the donor out of income the transferred assets
generated. The donor arranged the transaction in this way because he did
not have sufficient funds to pay the gift tax. The court accorded the donor
net gift treatment37 and held that the nature of the donor's retained interest
was an income interest. As such, the $150,000 was taxable as ordinary in-
come to the donor upon receipt."
Harrison v. Commissioner" and Lingo v. Commissioner, 0 which follow-
ed Staley, expanded the net gift concept to encompass gifts to a trust when
the trustee agreed to pay the gift tax."1 Although both courts justified net
gift treatment on the basis that the donors had retained an interest in the
properties transferred, neither opinion indicated that the nature of such in-
terest was regarded by the courts or the parties as an income interest. In ad-
dition, neither decision raised the issue of tax consequences to the donor
associated with the discharge of the donor's gift tax liability and consequent
disposition of the donor's retained interest.
The validity of net gift treatment was virtually assumed when the next
case arose in which the donor transferred property to a trust with the
trustee agreeing to pay the gift tax. In this decision, Estate of Sheaffer v.
Commissioner (Sheaffer I)," the trustee paid the $330,000 gift tax with in-
come generated by the trust assets while in the hands of the trustee and
with funds borrowed on the security of the trust assets. 3 The Service
sought to tax the donor on $255,000 of income generated by the trust assets
prior to the close of the tax year in which the gift tax was paid.
35. Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 310-14 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978),
and Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 360-64 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1969), provide the most detailed reviews of prior case law.
36. 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
37. 47 B.T.A. at 265. The donor had excluded $150,000 from the value of the gifts on his
tax return. Although the Service determined a deficiency, the Board of Tax Appeals found that
the $150,000 was properly excluded from the value of the gifts. The decision made no further
mention of the net gift issue.
38. It.is interesting to note that the taxpayer was not arguing that there were no tax conse-
quences associated with the receipt of the $150,000. Instead, the taxpayer argued that the
$150,000 constituted a return of capital. 47 B.T.A. at 265. This argument is analogous to a
part gift/part sale characterization.
39. 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 1350 (1952).
40. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954).
41. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
42. 37 T.C. 99 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963).
Sheaffer I is the first of two decisions involving this transaction. See also Estate of Sheaffer v.
Commissioner (Sheaffer II), 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 646 (1966) (discussed in text at notes 58-59 infra).
43. The trustee paid the $330,000 gift tax with $190,000 of income the trust corpus had
generated and with a $140,000 loan. By the close of the tax year in which the gift tax was paid,
the corpus had generated an additional $65,000 of income. 37 T.C. at 103 (1961).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The tax court held that the $255,000 was taxable to the donor as ordinary
income based on sections 671 and 677 of the Internal Revenue Code." Sec-
tion 677 provides that the grantor of a trust shall be treated as the owner of
the trust if the trust's income may be "distributed to the grantor or ...
held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor" at the discretion
of the grantor or of a nonadverse party. Treasury Regulations promulgated
under section 677 indicate that the possibility that income the trust
generates will be used to discharge a liability of the grantor provides a suffi-
cient nexus for treating the grantor as owning a portion of the trust."5
When the grantor is treated under section 677 as the owner of any portion
of the trust, section 671 operates to tax the donor on trust income.' 6 Thus,
the Sheaffer I court, citing Estate of Staley v. Commissioner,'7 held that:
We see no material difference in principle between making a gift of stock
in trust with a reservation . . . of the first $150,000 of income, which the
settlor intended to use to pay his gift taxes directly, as in Staley, and, as
in the instant case, the making of a gift of stock in trust with a provision
in the trust instrument that the trustee is to pay the gift tax. In both
cases, income is reserved for the benefit of the donor and, under section
677, is taxable to the donor."
Although the Sheaffer I court relied on Staley, it is imperative to draw a
distinction between the two cases. In Staley, the nature of the interest the
donor retained was clearly and exclusively an income interest in the trust;
the donor retained the right to $150,000 of income to be generated by the
trust assets. The interest the donor retained in Sheaffer I, however, was not
exclusively and specifically a right to income. The trust agreement in Sheaf-
fer I provided that the trustee was authorized to obtain a loan to pay all
gift taxes and to pledge the trust's corpus and income to secure this loan.49
44. Id. at 104.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-l(d) (1971), provides that "[uinder section 677 a grantor is, in
general, treated as owner of a portion of a trust whose income is, or in the discretion of the
grantor or a nonadverse party, or both may be applied in discharge of a legal obligation of the
grantor .. "
46. Section 671 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that:
Where it is specified .. .that the grantor or another person shall be treated as the
owner of any portion of a trust, there shall then be included in computing the tax-
able income and credits of the grantor or the other person those items of income,
deductions, and credits against tax of the trust which are attributable to that por-
tion of the trust to the extent that such items would be taken into account ... in
computing taxable income or credits against the tax of an individual.
I.R.C. § 671 (1976).
47. 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
48. 37 T.C. at 106. Income the corpus generates prior to the discharge of the donor's gift
tax liability is taxable to the donor pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 671, 677 (1976), regardless of
whether such income is actually used to discharge such liability. Krause v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed nolle pros., (6th Cir. 1972).
49. Specifically, the trust agreement provided:
The trustee is authorized and agrees to obtain a loan in an amount sufficient to
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The language of the trust agreement indicates that the retained interest was
not limited to the right to have trust income applied to the payment of the
gift tax. Nor does the fact that the donor was taxable on income the corpus
generated based on sections 671 and 677 render the retained interest an in-
come interest. The foregoing sections are frequently invoked to attribute
capital gains to the settlor of a Clifford Trust"0 when capital assets the trust
holds are sold and the trust retains the proceeds.' Whenever the grantor re-
tains some interest in the trust, sections 671 and 677 will operate to pass
through to the grantor those tax events of the trust which could conceivably
accrue to the benefit of the grantor. Thus, in Sheaffer I, the trust income
was taxable to the donor not because of a requirement that the gift tax be
paid out of trust income, but because trust income was subject to being
used for that purpose until the donor's gift tax liability was satisfied.52
The limited utility of sections 671 and 677 for the purpose of attributing
taxable income to the donor when the trustee agrees to satisfy the donor's
gift tax liability became apparent in Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner."
In Morgan, the trustee discharged the donor's entire gift tax liability with
borrowed funds before the trust corpus generated any income while in the
trustee's hands. The loan was subsequently repaid with income generated by
the trust assets. The Service sought to attribute this income to the donor
based on sections 671 and 677 apparently arguing that substitution of the
trustee's liability for the donor's gift tax liability did not constitute a ter-
mination of the donor's retained interest in the property. Thus, not until
the trustee's liability was discharged would the donor be insulated from
all income generated by the transferred assets. Although the court
conceded that, under certain circumstances, the trustee's loan would be
pay all [gift] taxes and to pledge or otherwise to apply such part or all of the cor-
pus and income of the trust estate, and to take such other action, as shall be re-
quired or deemed advisable by the trustee in order to secure the loan.
37 T.C. at 101.
50. In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the grantor created a trust for the
benefit of his wife. At the end of five years the trust was to terminate with the corpus to revert
to the grantor. The grantor also was sole trustee with the power to distribute income to the
beneficiary or retain income within the trust. Based on these facts, the Court held that the
grantor was the owner of the trust for income tax purposes. Id. at 335-37. Under I.R.C. §§
671-679 (1976 & West Special Supp. 1980), if certain requirements are satisfied a grantor can
avoid being taxed on income the trust corpus generates. Trusts which operate in this manner
are commonly called Clifford Trusts.
51. Rev. Rul. 79-223, 1979-2 C.B. 254; Rev. Rul. 75-267, 1975-2 C.B. 254; Rev. Rul.
66-161, 1966-1 C.B. 164.
52. As the court stated in Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed
nolle pros., (6th Cir. 1972), a case involving analogous facts, "It]rust income is taxable to peti-
tioner not because of any requirement that the gift taxes be paid out of income but because the
trust income, within the meaning of § 677, was subject to being used for that purpose at a time
when petitioner was personally liable for the tax." 56 T.C. at 1248.
53. 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963).
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deemed a sham and ignored,' 4 the court concluded that such circumstances
were not present in Morgan. Therefore, the court held that once the
donor's obligation is satisfied, no grounds remain for attributing future in-
come generated by the transferred property to the donor." The Morgan
holding indicates that the Service was proceeding with an inappropriate
theory since application of the proceeds of the trustee's loans to the donor's
gift tax liability constituted a termination of the donor's retained interest.
The decision does not suggest, however, that no tax consequences are
associated with termination of the donor's retained interest.
The Service's position in Morgan explains why the Service did not at-
tempt to establish tax consequences with respect to that portion of the
donor's gift tax liability that was discharged with proceeds the trustee bor-
rowed in Sheaffer 1.6 As in Morgan, the Service was apparently proceeding
in Sheaffer I with the mistaken belief that substitution of the trustee's
liability for the donor's liability would not preclude attributing to the donor
54. See, e.g., Russell v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 974 (1945) (loan involving related parties),
appeal dismissed, 154 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1946).
55. 37 T.C. at 984-85 (citing David Keith, 45 B.T.A. 644 (1941), acq., I.T. 11132, 1942-1
C.B. 101). In Keith, the settlor transferred assets in 1926 to an irrevocable trust subject to an
agreement that the trustees pay certain liabilities of the settlor out of the trust estate. The trust
agreement authorized the trustees to borrow on the security of the trust estate or to sell por-
tions of the corpus in order to discharge the settlor's indebtedness. In addition, the trustees
were required to deposit in a sinking fund a portion of the income the trust assets generated to
discharge the settlor's indebtedness, to discharge any indebtedness the trustees incurred and to
restore the trust estate to its original value if any portion of the corpus was sold to raise pro-
ceeds to discharge the settlor's indebtedness. Between 1926 and 1930 the trustees discharged
$232,000 of indebtedness with funds obtained from income, loans secured with trust corpus
and the sale of trust corpus. It is unclear whether the trustees discharged all of the settlor's in-
debtedness prior to discharging any of their own. By 1930, however, the indebtedness of all
parties had been discharged. 45 B.T.A. at 645-46.
The issue in Keith was whether trust income generated after 1930 and deposited in the sink-
ing fund to restore the trust estate to its original value was attributable to the settlor under the
predecessor to I.R.C. § 677 (1976). The court held:
[wihatever may have been said in 1926-1930 as to the propriety of attributing to
[settlorl the trust income used to discharge his debts, there is no theory upon which
the income of succeeding years may be attributed to him. It was not. . . used for
his benefit to discharge any of his obligations. His obligations had been paid in
1930 and no continuing obligation was left upon him.
45 B.T.A. at 646-47 (emphasis added).
It is unclear from the decision whether the Service attributed income to the settlor from
1926 to 1930 and whether all or part of such income was generated subsequent to the discharge
of the settlor's indebtedness. If, in fact, the Service did attribute income to the settlor between
1926 and 1930 that was generated after the substitution of the trustees' indebtedness for the
settlor's indebtedness, the taxpayer apparently did not challenge the Service for doing so. In-
stead, the taxpayer challenged the Service only to the extent that it attributed income to the
settlor after the trustees' substituted indebtedness had been discharged. If the foregoing
hypothesized events actually transpired, it is rather ironic that the case was ultimately cited in
Morgan to preclude the attribution of income to a settlor under circumstances in which the set-
tlor's gift tax liability was discharged with proceeds from the indebtedness the trustee incurred.
56. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
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trust income generated between the time that the donor's liability was
discharged and the trustee's liability was discharged. If this were the case, it
would have been logical for the Service to wait until such income was
generated and seek to attribute this income to the donor pursuant to sec-
tions 671 and 677 rather than attempt to tax the donor on the disposition of
the donor's retained interest at the time the donor's gift tax liability was
discharged."
That the foregoing is exactly what the Service had in mind at the time of
Sheaffer I is confirmed by Estate of Sheaffer v. Commissioner (Sheaffer
I).S8 In Sheaffer II, the Service sought to tax the Sheaffer I donor under
sections 671 and 677 on $72,000 of income the trust generated between the
time that the donor's gift tax liability was discharged and the time that the
loan proceeds the trustee used to pay the tax were repaid. Naturally, the
court held against the Service in light of Morgan." Here again, the holding
only indicates that sections 671 and 677 are an inappropriate route to taxa-
tion under these circumstances. The decision does not suggest that no tax
consequences are associated with the disposition of the donor's retained in-
terest.
In the decade following Sheaffer II, the Service frequently was con-
fronted with gifts of appreciated property to trusts and individuals that had
agreed to pay the donor's gift tax liability as a condition to the gift.
Regardless of the nature of the donee, the donor consistently claimed that
the only tax consequences associated with the transfer of property and the
discharge of the gift tax liability was a gift tax on the net gift. In the trust
cases, taxpayers apparently took notice of Morgan and Sheaffer II in struc-
turing their transactions. These taxpayers avoided the reach of sections 671
and 677 by ensuring that the gift tax liability was discharged before the
trust assets produced income while in the trustee's hands.6° With this route
to taxation foreclosed, the Service for the first time attempted to tax the
donor on the disposition of the donor's retained interest in the property
transferred when the trustee discharged the donor's gift tax liability. The
courts rejected the Service's theory, however, since the Service was claiming
that the nature of the donor's retained interest was an income interest.6 1
57. The Treasury will raise more revenue if income generated by the trust assets is at-
tributed to the donor as ordinary income since taxing the donor on the disposition of the
donor's retained interest often entails recovery of basis and capital gains rates. See notes 23-24
and accompanying text supra.
58. 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 646 (1966).
59. Id. at 650-51.
60. See, e.g., Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971) (trust income generated after
the payment of the donor's gift tax was not income of the donor), appeal dismissed nolle
pros., (6th Cir. 1972); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd,
469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972) (discharge of the donor's gift tax liability with assets held in a
pre-existing trust precluded the Service from attributing income to the donor under I.R.C. §§
671, 677 (1976)).
61. See the decision cited in note 60 supra. These courts were correct in concluding that
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
In those cases involving the transfer of property to individuals, the Ser-
vice endeavored to characterize the transaction as a part gift/part sale
rather than trying to reconcile the appropriate tax consequences with the re-
tained interest theory.62 The Service did not contest net gift treatment, but
argued that the net gift was incidental to a sale transaction in which the
donor realized gain to the extent that the donor's gift tax liability exceeded
the donor's basis in the property transferred. The Service, however,
departed from a pure part gift/part sale analysis in these cases when it con-
ceded that the donor did not recognize gain until the donee discharged the
donor's gift tax liability.6 3 The courts rejected the Service's position and
held for the taxpayers in these cases.
By the mid-1970's, the Service argued that a gratuitous transfer contin-
gent upon an agreement by the donee to pay the gift tax should be
characterized as a part gift/part sale regardless of whether the donee was an
individual or a trust.64 After a series of defeats in the Tax Court in which
the Service was apparently advancing some version of its part gift/part sale
theory,'  the Service has recently refrained from characterizing these trans-
the interest the donor retained was not an income interest. See note 49-52 and accompanying
text supra.
62. See, e.g., Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.
1978); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1969).
63. A delayed recognition of gain could be reconciled with a part gift/part sale characteri-
zation if there were some basis for establishing that, while the realization event occurs at the
time of transfer, recognition of gain is delayed until the gift tax is actually paid. No provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, however, lend support to this analysis.
64. The Service was obviously influenced by its success in characterizing a gift subject to a
donee's agreement to pay certain nonrecourse indebtedness of the donor as a part gift/part
sale. Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974). The Johnson decision, however, is of limited relevance to a
donee's agreement to pay the donor's gift tax liability because the gift tax is a recourse liabili-
ty. See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
65. The Service failed to adopt a consistent position as to whether the donor recognized
gain at the time of the transfer or at the time the donee discharged the donor's gift tax liabili-
ty. In several decisions the Service argued in the alternative that gain was recognized either
when the donee paid the gift tax or when the donor made the transfer. See, e.g., Bradford v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584, 594 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1032 (6th Cir. 1979); Estate
of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 669 (1978), appeal pending, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir.
argued July 16, 1980); Estate of Currey v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 800-01 (1981);
Benson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989, 990 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1032
(6th Cir. 1979).
In other cases, the Service argued that the gain should be recognized when the transfer oc-
curred. See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 881, 906 (1980); Grant v. Commissioner, 39
T.C.M. (CCH) 1088, 1089 (1979), rev'd sub nor., Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-2204). In Estate of
Weeden v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 699, 700 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-7127
(9th Cir. 1980), the Service assessed the tax deficiency in the year in which the gift tax was
paid. In Diedrich v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 433, 434-35 (1979), rev'd, 643 F.2d 499
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-2204); Owen v. Com-
missioner, 37 T.C.M. 272, 273 (1978), aff'd, 652 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1981) and McNeice v.
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actions as a part gift/part sale.66 In order to establish income tax conse-
quences to the donor with a part gift/part sale theory, it is essential to
demonstrate that a donee's mere promise to discharge the donor's gift tax
liability constitutes contemporaneous consideration for the transfer, thus
triggering a realization event at the time of the transfer. For some time rele-
vant authority would not facilitate a persuasive argument to this effect.
This, however, is no longer the case.
PART GIFr/PART SALE CHARACTERIZATION
The attributes of a part gift/part sale must be explored prior to consider-
ing whether a net gift transaction can be characterized as a part gift/part
sale. When property that would otherwise be transferred by gift is instead
transferred for consideration which is less than the fair market value of the
property, a sale element is introduced into the transaction. The transaction
is, therefore, characterized as a part gift/part sale. Typically, the considera-
tion the transferee provides is cash or other property.6 '7 Thus, if Y, the
donee in our hypothetical, transferred $700,000 in cash to X as a condition
to receiving the property worth $2,500,000, the transaction would be
justifiably treated as a part gift/part sale. Net gift treatment appropriately
results from this characterization because X makes a gratuitous transfer
only to the extent that the fair market value of the property exceeds
$700,000. Hence, Y pays for $700,000 of property and receives gratuitously
$1,800,000 of property.
A part gift/part sale also would be present if, as a condition to the
transfer, the donee remitted funds to a creditor of the donor. When a third
party discharges the debtor's recourse liability, the discharge of the liability
constitutes consideration and gain is as real as if the money were paid to
the debtor and the debtor, in turn, paid the creditor.68 Thus in the
hypothetical, if, conditional to the transfer of the shares, Y remitted
$700,000 to the government in satisfaction of X's gift tax liability, net gift
treatment again would be justified. This treatment is justified because the
donee received gratuitously only $1,800,000 worth of property. By paying
Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 969, 970 (1981), the Service's position was unclear because
the gift tax was paid in the same year that the transfer occurred.
66. See Owen v. Commissioner, 652 F.2d 1271, 1274 (6th Cir. 1981); Diedrich v. Commis-
sioner, 643 F.2d 499, 500-01 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981)
(No. 80-2204).
67. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204, 207 (1953) (the transfer of prop-
erty for a note which had a face value less than the fair market value of the transferred prop-
erty was a part gift/part sale); Rogers v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 994, 1002-03 (1935) (the
transfer of property for an annuity worth less than the fair market value of the transferred
property was a part gift/part sale).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938) (when one corporation
which was merging with a second corporation paid the indebtedness of the second corporation,
the second corporation received taxable income). When a debtor is personally liable the debt is
characterized as a recourse debt. Conversely, a debt is a nonrecourse debt when the debtor is
not personally liable for its payment.
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the government at the time of the transfer, Y provided contemporaneous
consideration for the balance of the property.
Additionally, a part gift/part sale occurs when the donee accepts property
subject to a nonrecourse liability.' 9 The donor realizes gain pursuant to the
transfer of property encumbered with a nonrecourse liability because an
obligation that previously would have been satisfied at the donor's expense
no longer poses any threat of diminishing the donor's wealth.7" In addition,
net gift treatment is justified because the donee receives gratuitously only
the net value of the property. The donee, in effect, pays for the balance by
relieving the donor of the obligation that was formerly burdening the
donor's wealth.
The foregoing analysis also is applicable to the donee's assumption of a
nonrecourse liability burdening the property transferred. 1 The donor's posi-
tion is the same regardless of whether the donee assumes or takes subject to
the nonrecourse liability. With respect to the donee who becomes personally
liable, the creditor is provided with additional protection in case the value
of the property falls below the value of the liability. The addition of the
donee's personal liability, however, has no bearing on that which the donee
is receiving gratuitously or that for which the donee is paying.
In contrast to the above transactions, it is more difficult to find contem-
poraneous consideration and hence a part gift/part sale when the donor
transfers property encumbered with a recourse liability. The problem with
demonstrating contemporaneous consideration in this situation is that unless
the donee assumes the liability and the creditor surrenders its claim against
the donor, the transfer of the property does not necessarily shift the burden
of the claim to the donee. Because the liability will not necessarily be
satisfied at the donee's expense,"2 it would appear that contemporaneous
69. It is important to note that the Old Colony Trust analysis, see note 7 and accompanying
text supra, is not applicable to a part gift/part sale. The Old Colony Trust analysis is limited
to the situation where a third party discharges a taxpayer's liability without receiving anything
in return. Thus, the taxpayer receives income equal to the entire amount of the discharged
liability. See text accompanying note 21 supra. In contrast, in a part gift/part sale the
discharge of the transferor's liability is contemporaneous to a property transfer. The discharge
of the liability constitutes consideration the transferor receives in exchange for a complete ter-
mination of interest in the property transferred. This exchange element allows the transferor to
recover the transferor's basis in the transferred property. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
70. In a sale, when a buyer takes property subject to a nonrecourse liability, the amount of
the liability is included in the seller's consideration. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14
(1947). This principle has been applied in the context of a gift. Estate of Levine v. Commis-
sioner, 634 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1980). It should be noted, however, that in Levine the donee
also assumed certain recourse liabilities of the donor.
71. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791
(1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.) (extension of Crane to gratuitous transfers subject to a
nonrecourse liability, at least when the donor receives additional consideration), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
72. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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consideration is lacking. Were this the case, the transfer could not properly
be characterized as a part gift/part sale. 3
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, however, case law suggests that
the donee's assumption of the donor's recourse liability justifies part
gift/part sale treatment. In Malone v. United States,"' state law provided
that the assumption of a recourse liability rendered the assuming party
primarily liable. Based on this law the district court found that it was suffi-
ciently probable at the time of the transfer that the liability would be
satisfied at the donee's expense to regard the assumption as contem-
poraneous consideration for the transfer." Similarly, in Evangelista v.
Commissioner,'" the court stated that when a trust assumes a recourse
liability, the assumption is sufficient to constitute contemporaneous con-
sideration for the transfer." The court reasoned that it would be highly
unlikely that the donor would be required to make payment because the
creditor could first attempt to secure payment from the trust assets and in-
come.'
8
Any lingering doubts with regard to whether the donee's assumption of a
recourse liability triggers a realization event were laid to rest with the adop-
73. Without contemporaneous consideration, no sale element is present. In the absence of a
sale element, a part gift/part sale analysis is inapplicable because either the gross value of the
property passes gratuitously or the donor retains an interest in the property transferred.
74. 326 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. The Malone court stated:
Granting that the assumption of debt did not constitute either a cancellation or
total discharge of [donor's] debt liability, the chances that he would ever have to
pay any portion of the debt were remote indeed. For even though the [creditor]
under Mississippi law still had the option to proceed against either [donee] or the
[donor] if the [debt] installments were not paid, [donor, who would be treated as a
surety under state law], would be subrogated to the rights of the [creditor] if he
were compelled to pay the [debt] and could thereafter go against both the income
[from the property and the property itself] to recoup any amounts he might have
paid to the [creditor].
326 F. Supp. at 111.
76. 629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. The court indicated, however, that if it had been proper to characterize the entire trans-
action as a gift rather than as a taxable disposition, the trust's assumption of the recourse
liability might not change this characterization. Id. at 1225.
78. The court stated:
After the assumption of the liability the [creditor] would look to whatever income
or assets the trust possessed for payment. Only in the event the trust income or
assets failed would [transferor] be called on to make payment. The assumption of
the liability substantially reduced [transferor's] responsibility on the [debt]; he was
no longer primarily liable. A potential situation in which [the transferor] would be
called on to make payment is too speculative to defeat the assertion that
[transferor] received an economic benefit in the amount of the liability assumed in
the year of the transfer. The amount of the liability assumed was an amount realiz-
ed. . ..
Id. The basis on which the court concluded that the transferee became primarily liable for the
debt cannot be ascertained from the decision.
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tion in 1980 of new Treasury Regulations promulgated under section 1001.1,
The regulations provide that the amount realized from a sale, gift, or other
disposition of property includes the amount of liability from which the
transferor is discharged. In addition, in the case of a recourse liability, a
donor will be treated as being discharged -from the liability if the donee
agrees to pay the liability. The donor is accorded this treatment even if the
creditor does not release the donor." Based on these regulations, sufficient
certainty exists at the time of the transfer that the obligation will be
satisfied at the expense of the donee to characterize the transaction as a
part gift/part sale.
When a donee merely takes property subject to a recourse liability rather
than assuming the liability, contemporaneous consideration is absent. The
possibility that the creditor will look to the property transferred for pay-
ment rather than to the donor is too remote to constitute contemporaneous
consideration. Without contemporaneous consideration, there is no realiza-
tion event and part gift/part sale treatment is precluded. Under these cir-
cumstances, a part gift/part sale characterization cannot be used to justify
net gift treatment. If the donor transfers the entire property to the donee
for no contemporaneous consideration, the gift must be valued at its gross
value. If the liability is subsequently satisfied at the expense of the donee,
additional tax consequences will result at that time. The gift tax resulting
from the prior transfer, however, will be unaffected."
It is, of course, arguable that a gift of property subject to a recourse
liability is sufficient to constitute contemporaneous consideration because it
creates a possibility that the liability will be satisfied at the donee's ex-
pense. If the value of the property transferred is substantially in excess of
the liability, the donor might refuse to pay and instead convince the
creditor to proceed against the property rather than institute collection pro-
ceedings against the donor.82 For this theory to be accepted, however, the
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980).
80. The new Treasury Regulations provide in pertinent part:
(1) [Tihe amount realized from a sale or other disposition of property includes the
amount of liabilities from which the transferor is discharged as a result of the sale
or disposition.
(4) For purposes of this section-
(i) The sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability
discharges the transferor from the liability if another person agrees to pay the
liability (whether or not the transferor is in fact released from liability);
(ii) A disposition of property includes a gift of the property . ...
Id.
81. Under an Old Colony Trust analysis, see note 7 and accompanying text supra, income
would be attributed to the donor at the time his or her liability was discharged.
82. See, e.g., Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186, 187-88 (8th Cir.
1945) (donee liable for the unpaid gift tax even though the donor was solvent and the tax had
not been assessed against the donor).
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holding in Crane v. Commissioner" must be extended to encompass the
transfer of property subject to a recourse liability. Recently, the Second
Circuit suggested that it would not necessarily reject such an extension of
Crane." At the present time, however, no precedent exists which indicates
that Crane would apply under these circumstances."5 In this regard, it is
significant that the Malone court, which applied Crane to the assumption of
a recourse liability, expressly based its decision on the fact that the donee
did not merely accept title subject to the mortgage but rather assumed
responsibility for payment of the underlying obligation. 6
Whether a promise by the donee to discharge the donor's gift tax liability
constitutes contemporaneous consideration resulting in a part gift/part sale
on which basis net gift treatment can be justified depends, therefore, upon
the nature of the gift tax liability and the extent to which the donee is com-
mitted to satisfying it. The donor is liable for payment of the gift tax and
therefore a gift tax liability is a recourse liability." A donee's agreement to
discharge the donor's gift tax liability constitutes an assumption of the
liability. This is the case notwithstanding that the government will not hold
the donee personally liable for the gift tax unless the donor fails to pay the
tax when due." The agreement constitutes an assumption because, as bet-
ween the donor and the donee, the agreement renders the donee ultimately
liable for the donor's gift tax.
In accord with the newly adopted Treasury Regulations, an agreement
that the donee will pay the gift tax is sufficient to trigger an immediate
realization event. Hence, if the new regulations are acknowledged, an argu-
ment that these transactions are properly characterized as a part gift/part
sale should prevail.89
83. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See note 70 supra.
84. Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. The Service has cited Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d
1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974), for this proposition. The Johnson holding
is inapplicable, however, because that case involved a transfer subject to a nonrecourse liabili-
ty. See note 71 supra.
86. 326 F. Supp. 106, 110-11 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
87. I.R.C. § 2502(d) (1976). After the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-34, § 442, 95 Stat. 172, becomes effective this provision will be found at I.R.C. § 2502(c).
88. Treas. Reg. § 301.6324-(1)(b) (1972).
89. The courts may be reluctant to characterize these transactions as entailing a sale ele-
ment in view of past decisions indicating that the donor's sole intent is gratuitous since these
transactions typically occur between family members. See Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 665 (1978), appeal pending, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. argued July 16, 1980); Turner v. Com-
missioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969). If this occurs, then the
donor should not be accorded net gift treatment and the payment of the gift tax liability by the
donee should be treated as a taxable gift from the donee. In the rare instances in which this
gift/gift theory has been raised, it has been flatly rejected. Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.
307, 315 (1974), alf'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978); Recent Development, Federal Income
Tax-Net Gift Doctrine, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 1074, 1086 n.101 (1978).
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THE RETAINED INTEREST THEORY
As the foregoing discussion indicates, recently adopted Treasury Regula-
tions enable the Service to treat a donor as realizing gain at the time of the
transfer of appreciated property contingent upon a donee's agreement to
pay the gift tax. Prior to the adoption of the regulations, the courts did not
regard a donee's promise to pay a donor's gift tax liability as contem-
poraneous consideration for a gift of appreciated property.9" Hence, the
Service's part gift/part sale characterization was rejected and net gift treat-
ment was justified only on the basis of the retained interest analysis. 9 ' Even
when net gift treatment is justified by the retained interest theory, that
theory, when carried to its logical conclusion, entails tax consequences in
addition to a gift tax on the net gift.92
Under the retained interest theory, the donor retains an interest in the
property transferred equivalent in value to the gift tax due on the transfer. 9
Thus, no realization event occurs at the time of the transfer. If the transfer
is to a trust and the trust assets generate income prior to the time that the
trustee discharges the donor's gift tax liability, then such income is attri-
butable to the donor pursuant to sections 671 and 677 of the Internal
Revenue Code.9' The donor is taxed on this income not because the donor
has retained an income interest, but rather, because income the trust assets
generate potentially could be applied to the donor's liability and hence used
for the donor's benefit.' Under these circumstances, it is at least arguable
that the aggregate income attributed to the donor should not exceed the
donor's gift tax liability and that the donor's retained interest disappears
once this amount of income has been attributed to the donor.96
If the foregoing argument is rejected or if the trust assets have generated
insufficient income prior to the discharge of the donor's gift tax liability to
eradicate the donor's retained interest, then the donor's retained interest is
necessarily disposed of at the time that the donee discharges the donor's gift
tax liability. In addition, if the donee is an individual rather than a trust, 9
the donor's retained interest is disposed of at the time the donee pays the
90. In the remote event that the courts reject the new Treasury Regulations, the Service
should be prepared to use the retained interest theory to establish the realization event which
these transactions necessarily entail.
91. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 16-24 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
96. Although little precedent exists to support this argument, it seems patently unfair to tax
the donor more than once on the same value.
97. There are no analogous provisions to I.R.C. §§ 671, 677 (1976), for individuals. The
common law "assignment of income" doctrine might be analogously applied in certain cases.
Under the assignment of income theory, an incomplete transfer of income-producing property
will not relieve the transferor of tax liability with respect to future income the property
generates. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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gift tax. In all of the foregoing cases, the disposition of the donor's retain-
ed interest is contemporaneous to the donee's payment of the donor's gift
tax liability. Thus, the donor is transferring the donor's retained interest in
the property for real and contemporaneous consideration at the time that
the donee discharges the donor's gift tax liability. Such a transfer is the
essence of a sale or exchange.98 Therefore, gain must be recognized at the
time that the donee pays the donor's gift tax liability irrespective of the tax
consequences associated with the earlier net gift.99
In Hirst v. Commissioner,'10 the tax court acknowledged that the retained
interest analysis logically entails a realization event.' 0 ' Nevertheless, the
court chose to ignore this logic and erroneously concluded that precedent
prevented it from acknowledging the realization event.' 2 The Hirst court's
conclusion indicates that it misinterpreted the earlier line of cases. Those
cases never explored the income tax consequences associated with the
disposition of the donor's retained interest when the retained interest was
not claimed to be an income interest.' 3 Thus, even if net gift treatment is
justified by the retained interest theory, the courts are not barred from ar-
riving at the analytically correct result that the realization event with respect
98. Both the retained interest analysis and a part gift/part sale characterization regard the
transfer as entailing both a gift and an exchange. Under the retained interest analysis, however,
the gift and the exchange do not occur simultaneously. Instead, the exchange occurs after the
transfer when the gift tax is paid. See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
99. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The donor will prefer a part gift/part sale characterization to the retained interest analysis
because the donor's taxable gain will be smaller if the transaction is characterized as a part
gift/part sale. Although the same amount will be realized regardless of which theory is
adopted, the donor can offset the amount realized with the donor's total basis in the trans-
ferred property if the transfer is characterized as a part gift/part sale. See note 30 supra. On
the other hand, if the transaction is characterized as a net gift followed by a disposition of the
donor's retained interest when the donee pays the gift tax, the donor can only offset the
amount realized with a pro rata portion of the donor's basis in the transferred property. Con-
sequently, the donor must recognize a larger gain than would be recognized in a part gift/part
sale transaction. See note 17 supra. The gain will be deferred, however, when the net gift is
followed by the disposition of the retained interest. No logical explanation for this difference
exists and it could be eliminated by allocating basis in all transactions characterized as a part
gift/part sale in the way in which basis is allocated when a bargain sale is made to a charity.
See note 30 supra.
100. 63 T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978).
101. The Hirst court stated:
The gift tax itself is imposed only upon the "net gift," i.e., upon the gross amount
of the property transferred minus the gift tax paid by the donee. In substance, a
portion of the transferred property equal in value to the amount of the gift tax is
not treated as having been part of the gift. But surely that portion did not vanish
into thin air, and a strong argument can be advanced for the conclusion that it was
exchanged for the donee's payment of the gift tax on the "net gift," a transaction
that may result in the realization of gain or loss depending upon the donor's basis
in the property.
63 T.C. at 315.
102. Id.
103. See note 35-64 and accompanying text supra.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
to that portion of the property which is not subject to gift tax is not entire-
ly avoided; it is merely delayed until the donee actually pays the donor's
gift tax."°"
RECENT APPELLATE DEVELOPMENTS
During the past year, two circuit courts of appeals have reviewed Tax
Court decisions involving the income tax consequences to the donor pur-
suant to the transfer of appreciated property contingent upon a donee's
agreement to pay the donor's gift tax. In the consolidated Eighth Circuit
cases, Diedrich v. Commissioner and Grant v. Commissioner,"' the donors
transferred low basis, highly appreciated securities to family members. The
gifts were expressly conditioned on the donees' promise to pay all gift taxes
arising from the transfers. The Service determined that the transfers
resulted in taxable income to the donors in the years in which the transfers
occurred to the extent that the gift tax exceeded the donors' total basis in
the securities.' 6 The Tax Court held for the donors.' The Eighth Circuit
reversed, asserting that prior cases were erroneously decided and that when
the donees discharged the donors' gift tax liability the benefit conferred
resulted in taxable income to the donors.'0
The Eighth Circuit's analysis does not clearly indicate on what theory of
taxation the Service and the court were relying. By finding that the series of
cases rejecting the Service's part gift/part sale characterization was incor-
rectly decided,' °0 and by allowing the donors to offset the amount realized
with the donors' total basis in the property transferred, the court appeared
to be utilizing a part gift/part sale approach." ' The court's decision,
however, never mentions the part gift/part sale theory and fails to adopt
the retained interest theory. Instead, the court acknowledges an abstract
ieconomic benefit" theory the Service ostensibly advanced.''' The court's
analysis implies that the donees were unilaterally thrusting a benefit on the
donors when the donees paid the gift tax." 2 The foregoing analysis,
104. The magnitude of the donor's gain will vary depending upon which theory the courts
adopt. See note 99 supra. Although taxpayers may have interpreted precedent as indicating
that these transactions do not entail income tax consequences, this is no excuse for
perpetuating the myth. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499, 504 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-2204). But see note 3 and accompanying text
supra.
105. 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981).
106. In Diedrich, the transfers occurred and the gift tax was paid in the same year. See
note 65 supra.
107. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1979); Grant v. Commissioner, 39
T.C.M. (CCH) 1088 (1979).
108. 643 F.2d at 504.
109. Id. at 502.
110. See notes 25-32 and accompanying text supra.
Ill. 643 F.2d at 502.
112. The Diedrich court explicitly relied on Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279
U.S. 716 (1929). See notes 7 & 69 and accompanying text supra. In Old Colony Trust, the third
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however, is incongruous with a donor's recovery of basis.' 3 If gain is not
realized until the gift tax is paid and the donor is permitted to recover basis
notwithstanding that the donor previously transferred the property, there
must be a means available by which the donor can retain basis. The only
conceivable manner in which the donor can retain basis is if the donor is
treated as retaining an interest in the property transferred."" As was
previously indicated, however, the Diedrich court failed to adopt the retain-
ed interest theory.
In a Sixth Circuit decision, Owen v. Commissioner,"'  the donor
gratuitously transferred highly appreciated stock to several trusts contingent
upon the corporate trustee's payment of the donor's gift tax. The stock was
transferred and the gift tax paid during the same taxable year of the donor.
The donor did not report any gain from the transfer but the Service deter-
mined that the donor realized gain to the extent that the donor's gift tax
liability exceeded the donor's basis in the transferred stock. The Tax Court
held for the donors' 6 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, indicating precedent
dictated its decision."'
It is clear that the Service did not advance a part gift/part sale theory of
taxation in Owen."' Instead, the Service argued that the trustee's payment
of the gift tax constituted gross income to the donor under section 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code, that the discharge of the donor's gift tax liability
gave rise to income pursuant to an Old Colony Trust analysis, and that the
benefit the donor received pursuant to the discharge of the donor's gift tax
liability was equivalent to the receipt of gross income pursuant to the Crane
doctrine.'" Because the court based its holding on stare decisis it refrained
from analyzing the Service's arguments although it did indicate that the Ser-
vice's position was somewhat persuasive. '
Notwithstanding the court's comment as to the persuasiveness of the Ser-
vice's position, the Service's arguments in Owen are technically deficient
because they fail to justify why the donor is entitled to recover basis at the
time that the donor's gift tax liability is discharged.'"' In order to recover
basis at that time, the donor must have retained an interest in the property
transferred. 22 The Service's arguments, however, essentially ignored this re-
tained interest.
party who discharged the taxpayer's liability received nothing from the taxpayer in return. In
contrast, an exchange element was present in Diedrich.
113. See note 69 supra.
114. See notes 16-24 and accompanying text supra.
115. 652 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1981).
116. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 272 (1978).
117. 652 F.2d at 1278.
118. Id. at 1277.
119. See note 70 supra.
120. 652 F.2d at 1278.
121. See note 69 and the text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
122. See notes 16-32 and accompanying text supra.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
While neither the Eighth Circuit nor the Sixth Circuit articulated a
technically sound theory for establishing the necessary income tax conse-
quences to the donor pursuant to a gift of appreciated property contingent
upon a donee's agreement to pay the gift tax, the disagreement among the
circuits resulting from the disposition of those cases has had one positive ef-
fect. On October 5, 1981, the United States Supreme Court granted the tax-
payer's petition for a writ of certiorari and will now review the Eighth Circuit's
Diedrich decision."' Thus, the long-awaited opportunity to wipe the slate
clean and start over again may finally have arrived. 2 "
CONCLUSION
When appreciated property is transferred gratuitously contingent upon a
donee's agreement to discharge the donor's gift tax liability, net gift treat-
ment can be justified either by characterizing the transaction as a part
gift/part sale or by employing a retained interest analysis. A part gift/part
sale characterization entails, in addition to a gift tax on the net gift, the
realization of gain by the donor at the time of the transfer. Gain is
recognized to the extent that the gift tax on the net gift exceeds the donor's
entire basis in the property transferred.
Alternatively, if net gift treatment is justified by resort to the retained in-
terest theory, there are still tax consequences in addition to the gift tax on
the net gift. The donor realizes gain at the time that the donee discharges
the donor's gift tax liability to the extent that the'gift tax on the net gift ex-
ceeds that portion of the donor's basis attributable to the donor's retained
interest in the transferred property. Thus, regardless of how net gift treat-
ment is justified, a gift of appreciated property made pursuant to the
donee's agreement to pay the gift tax entails, in addition to a gift tax on the
net gift, a realization event and, therefore, income tax consequences to the
donor. The only question is whether that realization event occurs at the
time of the transfer or at the time that the donee discharges the donor's gift
tax liability.
Now that the Supreme Court has agreed to rule on whether there are in-
come tax consequences to the donor pursuant to a gift of appreciated prop-
erty contingent upon an agreement by the donee to pay the gift tax, the
uncertainty surrounding this issue should finally be eliminated. As the
foregoing discussion indicates, as long as net gift treatment is allowed under
these circumstances, there are necessarily income tax consequences to the
donor when appreciated property is transferred in this manner. Although
some practitioners may mourn any reduction in the planning premium
associated with a pretransfer agreement,' 2' the certainty resulting from an
123. 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-2204).
124. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
125. Establishing the realization event will not eliminate entirely the planning premium
resulting from a pretransfer agreement. Net gift treatment is unaffected, hence the presence of
a pretransfer agreement will result in a lesser gift tax than would otherwise be imposed. See
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authoritative, analytically correct decision will enable tax planners to focus
more attention on technically sound tax saving strategies.
notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra. In addition, the income tax payable by the donor
when the donee pays the gift tax pursuant to a pretransfer agreement will be less than when the
donee pays the gift tax in the absence of an obligation to do so because the donor will receive
less income, will be entitled to recover basis and may be eligible for capital gains rates if a
pretransfer agreement is utilized. Compare notes 4-8 and accompanying text supra with notes
16-32 and accompanying text supra.

